Motivated by the evidence that investors tend to be overly optimistic about low-priced stocks, we examine how nominal price affects the cross section of stock returns. To circumvent the mechanical inverse relationship between price and expected return, we construct a novel way of examining the effect of nominal price on the cross section of stock returns. In the cross-section, a portfolio exploiting this strategy generates a value-weighted (equal-weighted) four-factor alpha of 85 (88) basis points per month, while raw price does not predict return robustly. Consistent with a mispricing-based explanation, the results are stronger for hard-to-arbitrage stocks and following high sentiment periods, and strategy returns are highly correlated with contemporaneous changes in sentiment. Using stock splits as an exogenous change in price level, we find that the post-split return dynamics mimic those predicted by our hypothesis. Evidence from earnings surprises and analyst price target forecasts confirms that beliefs are overly optimistic for low-priced stocks. Providing further evidence that the results reflect a belief-based rather than purely a preference-based channel, we find that the effect is distinct from other gambling related proxies that have been used in the past such as extreme returns, idiosyncratic volatility, and skewness. † The authors are grateful for valuable comments received from
Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that investors possess an irrational belief that stocks with lower nominal prices have greater upside potential.
1 Recent studies also speculate that irrational beliefs induced by nominal price are likely to be a primary explanation for other observed pricerelated phenomena, such as the observed preference of individual investors for low-priced stocks (Kumar (2009)), comovement of stocks with similar price levels (Green and Hwang (2009)), and time-variation in premiums for low-priced stocks (Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) ).
Using option pricing data to extract investors' skewness expectations, Birru and Wang (2015) find direct evidence that investors perceive lower priced stocks to have greater upside potential.
In this paper we test whether nominal price also has predictive power for the cross-section of stock returns. Overly optimistic investor expectations for low-priced stocks predict that lowpriced stocks will likely be overpriced relative to high-priced stocks, thereby delivering lower future risk-adjusted stock returns. In this paper, we find strong evidence in support of a nominal price premium for low-priced stocks.
The cross-sectional relationship between raw nominal prices and future returns is likely to underestimate the real economic magnitude of the nominal price premium. This is because a sort on raw nominal price is confounded by the mechanical relationship between raw nominal price and expected returns. Any model of prices (e.g., the Gordon growth model) inversely links prices and expected returns. Stocks with higher risk will have higher expected returns, causing future cash flows to be discounted at a higher rate when determining price, and therefore leading 1 For example, a number of mutual fund families offer "low-priced" stock funds in an effort to appeal to investor psychology. These funds primarily invest in stocks trading below a specified price per share (the definition varies by fund, but is typically in the $15-$35 range). The notion that low-priced stocks have more upside potential is often reinforced by these funds in their prospectuses. Fidelity, Perritt, RS Funds, and Royce are examples of fund families that have previously launched low-priced funds. See Birru and Wang (2015) for further discussion.
to a lower price today. 2 It is therefore not surprising that past research has not documented a relationship between nominal price and future returns, as a sort on raw nominal price combines two countervailing forces -a nominal price premium (predicting that low-priced stocks should exhibit low future returns) and a mechanical discount-rate effect (predicting that low-priced stocks should exhibit high future returns). To the extent that existing asset pricing models (e.g., Fama and French (1993) three-factor model) cannot perfectly adjust for risk, using raw nominal price as a sorting variable will underestimate the nominal price premium. 3 For this reason, using raw nominal price is problematic. Table A1 of the Appendix illustrates this point by using FamaMacBeth regressions to examine the cross-sectional relationship between raw price and future excess returns. As the results in Column 1 show, in the cross-section, raw price has no predictive ability for future excess returns. The remaining columns confirm that this conclusion persists with the introduction of various controls.
We navigate this problem by using a fitted price variable estimated by capitalizing on the strong cross-sectional relationship between price and a set of nominal variables from accounting statements: assets per share, book value per share, earnings per share, and dividends per share.
Importantly, the fitted price variable is highly correlated with raw nominal price, but at the same time, is unlikely to suffer from the mechanical relationship with expected returns discussed above.
A strategy that holds a long position in high fitted price stocks and a short position in low fitted price stocks generates a value-weighted (equal-weighted) four-factor alpha of over 85 (88) 2 Miller and Scholes (1982) actually use the reciprocal of price per share as a measure of risk. 3 This argument is similar to that given in Berk (1995) to explain the size premium. Consistent with this logic, in Table A1 , we find that the excess return of the long-short portfolio sorted by raw price per share is insignificantly different from zero. However, after controlling for risk via the Fama-French factors or the Fama-French-Carhart factors, long-short portfolios exhibit economically and statistically significant alphas.
basis points per month. Consistent with overpricing of low-priced stocks, we find that most of the abnormal returns accrue to the short leg of the strategy rather than the long leg that is invested in high-priced stocks. Further consistent with a mispricing story, we also find that the results are stronger in the presence of greater limits to arbitrage, and that low-priced stocks are most overpriced relative to high-priced stocks during high sentiment periods -that is, the bulk of the strategy returns occur following times of high sentiment and further, as sentiment decreases, high-priced stocks attain high returns relative to low-priced stocks.
Using stock splits as an exogenous change in price level (Green and Hwang (2009) , Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009)), we find that the return dynamics observed in the postsplit period mimic those predicted by our hypothesis. Specifically, we find that after splitting to a lower price level, stocks exhibit positive abnormal returns in the short run, followed by negative abnormal returns in the long-run. This is consistent with investors bidding up the prices of lowpriced stocks to overvalued levels, and this being followed by the slow correction of mispricing.
The results are distinct from studies examining the relationship between lottery-like stock attributes and returns, both conceptually and empirically. Empirically, our results are robust to controls for idiosyncratic volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) ), max daily return of the past month (Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) ), expected idiosyncratic skewness (Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) ), the TK prospect theory variable of Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2015) , and coskewness (Harvey and Siddique (2000)). Conceptually, past studies have examined the relationship between lottery-like stock attributes and returns from purely a preference for skew channel, while we document an effect arising from a belief-based channel.
Consistent with a belief-based channel, we provide direct evidence in support of the view that market participants have overly optimistic expectations regarding low-priced stocks. Consistent with over-optimism toward low-priced stocks, we find that fitted price strongly predicts earnings surprises. Low-priced stocks have systematically negative earnings surprises, while high-priced stocks experience systematically positive earnings surprises. We find similar evidence when examining analyst price forecasts. Low-priced stocks have substantially higher analyst price appreciation expectations than high-priced stocks. These findings on investors' expectational errors cannot be explained by purely a preference for skew channel (Barberis and Huang (2008)), and therefore provide supporting evidence that the results are (at least partially) driven by a belief-based channel.
While the evidence we present strongly supports the errors in beliefs channel, it is likely that a second channel also contributes to the predictability of price-sorted returns. In particular, Birru and Wang (2015) find that while there exists no empirical relationship between nominal price and skewness after one controls for other firm characteristics, investors nevertheless incorrectly perceive low-priced stocks to have greater upside potential. This error in beliefs regarding the skewness of low-priced stocks, coupled with investor preference for skew is a further potential cause of overpricing among low-priced stocks, and likely strengthens the asset pricing outcomes we observe.
Our paper is also related to the literature on nominal price. Baker, Greenwood and (2015) provide direct evidence by using option data to back out investor expectations. However, they do not examine how nominal price affects the cross section of stock returns.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the fitted price variable and introduces the data. Section 3 examines portfolio returns and explores hypotheses related to limits to arbitrage. Section 4 examines price dynamics following stock splits. Section 5 tests whether nominal prices induce expectational errors. Section 6 concludes.
Data
Nominal price and expected return are mechanically linked, as riskier firms will require higher returns and thus have lower prices. To the extent that existing asset pricing models (e.g., Fama and French (1993) 
where Price is the market price per share at the end of the fiscal year, BPS is book value per share, EPS is earnings per share, APS is total assets per share, and DPS is dividend per share.
5 Table 1 defines these and the other main variables used throughout the study. Each of the variables in the fitted regression is measured as a per share variable. The fitted variable from nominal price combines two countervailing forces -a nominal price premium (predicting that low-priced stocks should exhibit low future returns) and a mechanical discount-rate effect (predicting that low-priced stocks should exhibit high future returns). Disentangling these two forces is the key of this study. However, Kumar (2009) Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Nikolaev (2015) find that undoing Compustat's adjustments (subtracting XRD from XSGA) can better align expenses and revenue, and therefore they suggest measuring operating profitability as Sale-COGS-XSGA+RD. In unreported analysis, we find that profitability calculated in this way predicts price level better than the gross profit variable (Sale-COGS) proposed by Novy-Marx (2013) .
equation (1) therefore circumvents the mechanical relationship between raw price and future stock returns.
All the variables are measured at the same fiscal year end. The choice of these variables is largely based on the accounting valuation literature, which shows that these variables are important for stock price (e.g., Ohlson (1995) ). We use accounting data starting in December of 1967. We include observations for which firm market capitalization is at least $10 million and for which there are positive values for book equity per share, and for which total assets per share, earnings per share, and dividends per share are not missing. All accounting variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. We also exclude observations where price is less than $1 or greater than $1,000. We use the natural logarithm of the fitted value (denoted as Price*) as our main variable of interest in much of the analysis that follows. Table 2 shows regression coefficient estimates for the cross-sectional price regressions.
Columns 1-4 display coefficients of univariate regressions. As expected, in a univariate setting, each of the four variables has a positive and statistically significant relationship with price.
Column 5 displays coefficient estimates for the multivariate specification where all variables are included together. When all variables are included together, the sign on assets per share flips, while the remaining variables continue to display positive coefficients. The fitted regression in Column 5 has a rather high adjusted R 2 of 55.2%. The correlation coefficient between Price* and raw Price is 72.4%, suggesting that Price* and raw price are closely related. Therefore it is not surprising that in our later analysis, portfolios sorted by Price* also have very large crosssectional spreads in raw price. Unless otherwise specified, we use Price* from the specification in Column 5 in the remainder of the analysis. Table 4 shows excess returns, alpha from the Fama-French three-factor model, and alpha from the three-factor model along with the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. 7 In each of the models, returns are generally increasing in Price* decile. Consistent with low-priced firms being overpriced, the majority of the spread in alphas comes from the short side of the portfolio. For example, the four-factor alpha for the value-weighted strategy is 85.4 basis points per month, 6 We follow the convention of Fama and French (1992) to match Price* and stock returns. 7 Returns throughout the paper are adjusted for delisting. Following Shumway (1997) , in the case of delisting we set observations with delisting code of 500,520, 551-573, 574, 580, and 584 to -30%. Otherwise, if the CRSP return is available, we aggregate the return and delisting return as the last return. If the monthly return on CRSP is not available, we use the delisting return as the last return of the stock. Results are similar without the delisting return adjustment.
Portfolio Return Analysis
with the short leg earning -77.9 basis points and the long leg of the strategy earning a statistically insignificant 7.5 basis points. Table 5 displays the portfolio factor loadings for the long-short portfolios displayed in Table 4 . The loadings from the strategy suggest that relative to high-priced stocks, low-priced stocks have higher betas, resemble small firms, and tend to resemble growth rather than value. Table 6 displays results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on Price* and controls.
Column 1 shows the univariate specification. Consistent with the earlier portfolio sorts, Price* is positively related to future returns. Column 2 includes beta, size, and book-to-market. The inclusion of these variables decreases the magnitude of the coefficient on Price* by about 25%, but nevertheless Price* remains economically and statistically significant in predicting returns.
In Column 3, controls are included for momentum, long-term reversal, illiquidity, the liquidity shock variable from Bali, Peng, Shen, and Tang (2014), and idiosyncratic volatility. The inclusion of these variables does not alter the interpretation of the relationship between Price* and returns. The inclusion of these variables reduces the coefficient of Price* by nearly 50% relative to the univariate specification, however, Price* still continues to be significant at the 1% level. Finally, Column 4 includes operating profitability from Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and
Nikolaev (2015), asset growth from Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) , and the Altman Z-score.
Relative to the specification in Column 3, the inclusion of these additional variables has virtually no effect on the coefficient of Price*.
Robustness
Kumar (2009) hypothesizes that investors treat stocks with low nominal price as a "cheap bet," and that individual investors have excess demand for these lottery-like assets. To the extent that Price* is correlated with other variables that capture lottery-like attributes of a stock, we may be overstating the influence of price on returns. To examine whether this is the case, we add a number of gambling proxies to the Fama-MacBeth regression specification. Table 7 examines the relationship between returns and Price* after controlling for these gambling proxies.
In Column 1 of Table A2 shows that high Price* stocks experience higher alphas than low Price* stocks. The difference is statistically significant in each of the three lottery classifications for equal-weighted returns, and significant for all but non-lottery stocks for value-weighted returns. The analysis again confirms that the predictive power of Price* is distinct from that of the Kumar (2009) lottery variable.
A further concern is that one of the regressors of the fitted price regression might be somehow driving the portfolio results. Of particular concern, past work has documented a relationship between profitability and returns in the cross-section (Novy-Marx (2013); Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Nikolaev (2015)). To the extent that earnings per share is correlated with profitability, perhaps our results are somehow related to the profitability anomaly. Table 8 shows that this is not the case.
8 Kumar (2009) find that lottery stocks deliver negative alpha and non-lottery stocks deliver positive alpha. Consistent with Kumar (2009) , in unreported results, we find that the coefficient of Lottery (Non-Lottery) in FamaMacBeth regression is negative (positive). However, neither the coefficient of Lottery nor Non-Lottery in Column (7) and Column (8) of Table 7 is significant. We find that this is mainly because, in these two models, we control for idiosyncratic volatility which is one component of the lottery variable of Kumar (2009) and has been used as a lottery variable on its own (Han and Kumar, 2013) . Table 8 performs conditional sorts on profitability and Price*. We first sort stocks into quintiles based on the operating profitability measure of Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and
Nikolaev (2015), and then within each profitability quintile we sort stocks into quintiles based on Price*. 9 Panel A displays equal-weighted portfolio four-factor alphas, while Panel B displays four-factor alphas for value-weighted portfolios. Within each profitability quintile, both equalweighted and value-weighted returns are generally increasing in Price*, and the difference in top minus bottom Price* quintiles is statistically significant at the 5% or better level in seven out of the ten profitability quintiles and significant at the 10% level in another. The exception is the highest profitability quintile. We would expect stocks in this quintile to be the least speculative and have the fewest limits to arbitrage (Baker and Wurgler (2006)), therefore suggesting that these stocks should exhibit very little effect of price-based investor demand. Consistent with this, Price* does not exhibit strong predictability for returns within this quintile. On the other hand, the magnitude of the difference in top and bottom Price* quintile is the largest in the lowest profitability quintile. This is also consistent with a mispricing story, as investors demanding lowpriced stocks due to speculative motives will likely find unprofitable stocks to be particularly speculative due to their highly subjective valuations, suggesting the portfolio returns from a Price* based strategy should be particularly large in magnitude for stocks of the lowest profitability quintile. Furthermore, these stocks are also likely to have the greatest limits to arbitrage, again suggesting that we should expect to find the largest portfolio return magnitudes in this quintile. In unreported analysis, we have also confirmed that ability of Price* to predict returns within profitability quintiles is not simply due to Price* serving as a further sort on profitability. The results show that Price* has strong predictive ability for returns even after 9 Results are very similar if we use other profitability measure, such as the gross profitability measure of Novy-Marx (2013) or ROE.
controlling for profitability, eliminating the concern that a sort on profitability is somehow driving our observed results.
Eliciting further comfort that our results are distinct from profitability, in unreported results we find that the correlation of Price* with profitability is actually lower than the correlation of the raw nominal price variable with profitability (0.269 vs 0.331). In Table 9 we also report four-factor alphas for long-short portfolios that are sorted based on Price* fitted using only book price per share in the fitted regression (i.e., not including earnings, assets, or dividends per share variables). The top row of Table 9 displays the portfolio alphas and shows that the main results are not dependent on using a version of Price* that incorporates earnings per share. The second panel of the table shows that the results hold in both the first and second half of the sample, and the third panel shows that the results hold when excluding stocks priced below $5.
Both value-weighted and equal-weighted alphas become smaller once we exclude stock priced below $5. This is not surprising, given that this shrinks the spread of our sorting variable, while also eliminating the stocks for which individual investors are more important, and the stocks most difficult to arbitrage. Nevertheless, the results are not driven by extremely low priced stocks as the removal of stocks under $5 only decreases the VW (EW) four-factor alpha by about 32% (23%). Blume and Stambaugh (1983) show that microstructure noise induces (due to Jensen's inequality) upward bias in measured stock returns, with the bias approximately proportional to the variance of the noise. Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2010, 2013) argue that this can lead to bias in empirical asset pricing studies, particularly when security-level explanatory variables are cross-sectionally correlated with the amount of noise. Price* is likely to be correlated with the noise. Following Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2010, 2013),
we use "return-weighted" portfolio returns, where the weights are (1+the stock's lagged monthly return). This is similar to equal weighting but with correction for potential bias due to market microstructure noise. Using this methodology, the four-factor alpha increases from 0.877% to 1.010%. 10 Finally, the last row shows that the results are robust to also including the PastorStambaugh (2003) liquidity factor along with the Fama-French and Carhart factors.
Limits to Arbitrage
If the spread in returns between high and low price portfolios is driven by mispricing, then we should expect the spread in return to be largest (the mispricing to be greatest) for those stocks that are the most difficult or riskiest to arbitrage. We explore this hypothesis next. Table   10 explores how long-short Price* portfolio returns vary with various limits to arbitrage proxies used previously in the literature.
We use idiosyncratic volatility, institutional ownership, illiquidity, and size as proxies for limits to arbitrage. Pontiff (1996) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) , show that stocks with greater idiosyncratic volatility are more risky to arbitrage. Stocks with less institutional ownership are also more likely to be affected by irrational demand of individual investors. Nagel (2005) uses institutional ownership as a proxy for difficulty of shorting. We expect that stocks with less institutional ownership will have greater limits to arbitrage as these stocks are more difficult to short. Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, which captures the impact of order flow on stock price -another concern for arbitrageurs. Higher illiquidity is therefore associated with greater limits to arbitrage. Finally, small stocks have greater limits to arbitrage as they are typically more difficult to short, have less institutional ownership, and greater illiquidity and idiosyncratic volatility. Table 10 sorts stocks into quintiles by each of the limits to arbitrage proxies, and then examines the four-factor alphas for a long-short Price* portfolio for each quintile. Consistent with a mispricing story, for each limit to arbitrage proxy, the magnitude of the return to the longshort portfolios is greatest in the highest limit to arbitrage quintile. The long-short portfolio return is greatest for the smallest quintile of stocks, the most illiquid quintile of stocks, the highest idiosyncratic volatility quintile of stocks, and the lowest institutional ownership quintile of stocks.
While the effect is monotonic in size, with the largest spread appearing in the smallest quintile of stocks, the size sorts also provide reassurance that the results are not purely driven by small stocks, as the sort on size is based on NYSE breakpoints, and a sort on Price* still produces a statistically and economically significant spread in returns within the fourth size quintile. Even for the largest size quintile the spreads in returns exhibit the correct sign, albeit not statistically significantly. Table 11 uses cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions to confirm the portfolio sort results. In Table 11 we include the limits to arbitrage variables alone and interacted with Price* in order to ascertain the extent to which portfolio returns are dependent on limits to arbitrage.
The interaction term between Price* and size in Column 1 is negative, showing that Price* portfolio returns are decreasing in size, consistent with limits to arbitrage being greatest for small stocks. Column 2 finds that portfolio returns are increasing in illiquidity, consistent with the most illiquid stocks having the greatest limits to arbitrage. Column 3 shows that portfolio returns are increasing in idiosyncratic volatility, consistent with high idiosyncratic volatility stocks facing the greatest limits to arbitrage. Finally, Column 4 shows that portfolio returns are decreasing in institutional ownership, consistent with low institutional ownership stocks having the greatest limits to arbitrage. The limits to arbitrage results are consistent with a mispricing-based explanation for the results.
Sentiment and Nominal Price Premium
If the cross-sectional predictability of Price* is attributable to mispricing, then additional implications for returns emerge when conditioning on times of high or low sentiment.
Specifically, our story suggests that low Price* stocks are more speculative than high Price* stocks. Therefore, if investors believe that low-priced stocks have more upside potential, then they will be particularly likely to believe this when sentiment is high or when sentiment increases. Times of increasing sentiment and overpricing should therefore be associated with high returns for low-priced stocks relative to high-priced stocks, conversely times of decreasing sentiment should be associated with high returns for high-priced stocks relative to low-priced stocks. The implication is that returns on a portfolio long high Price* stocks and short low Price* stocks should be negatively related to contemporaneous changes in sentiment. Controls for the excess market return, small minus big size factor, high-minus-low book-to-market factor, and the up-minus-down momentum factor are also included. Panel A reports the results for EW portfolios and Panel B reports the results for VW portfolios. The first three columns of Table 12 test the hypothesis related to contemporaneous changes in sentiment.
Consistent with the hypothesis that returns on a portfolio long high Price* stocks and short low Price* stocks should be negatively related to contemporaneous changes in sentiment, change in sentiment enters with a negative and significant coefficient in the regression of long minus short portfolio alphas in Column 3. Consistent with times of increasing sentiment being associated with high returns for low-priced stocks and lower returns for high-priced stocks, the coefficient on the contemporaneous sentiment change is positive and significant for the short leg of the portfolio in Column 2, and negative and significant for the long leg of the portfolio in column 1.
Consistent with Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) most of the mispricing is driven by the short leg, as the coefficient for the short leg in Column 2 is about four times as large in absolute magnitude as the coefficient for the long leg in Column 1.
Columns 3-6 specifically test the Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012) hypothesis that the profitability of the long-short strategy should occur primarily following periods of high sentiment, and more specifically that the long-short portfolio return should be driven primarily by the short leg. The positive and significant coefficient on one-period lagged sentiment in Column 6 shows that higher long-short portfolio returns occur following periods of high sentiment. Consistent with Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), Column 4 shows that the alpha for the long portfolio is slightly higher following periods of high sentiment. Most importantly, consistent with the effect being driven primarily by the short leg following times of high sentiment, the large negative and significant coefficient on lagged sentiment in Column 5 shows that the short portfolio performs particularly poorly following periods of high sentiment. This is consistent with the idea that short-sale impediments should cause returns to mispricing strategies to primarily be driven by the short leg of the strategy, and specifically to accrue to the short leg of the strategy following periods of high sentiment.
Columns 6-9 include both changes in contemporaneous sentiment and the lagged sentiment level together. Regardless of the specification, returns to the long-short Price* sorted portfolio are negatively related to contemporaneous changes in sentiment, and positively related to lagged sentiment. The results are consistent with times of increasing sentiment coinciding with increases in returns for low-priced stocks relative to high-priced stocks, and times of decreasing sentiment coinciding with decreases in returns for low-priced stocks relative to high-priced stocks. The evidence is again consistent with a mispricing-based explanation for the observed nominal price premium.
Stock Splits
Next, we examine the behavior of returns following stock splits. Stock splits provide a relatively clean setting to examine the response of returns to an exogenous change in price. The prevailing view in the literature is that stock splits are motivated by a desire to return prices to a normal trading range (Baker and Gallagher (1980), Lakonishok and Lev (1987) , Conroy and Harris (1999) , Dyl and Elliot (2006) , and Weld, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi (2009)).
11
Furthermore, the stock split analysis does not rely on fitted price, and as such serves as a complement to the fitted price analysis.
In particular, stock splits allow us to explore whether the return dynamics predicted by our hypothesis are consistent with the data. Specifically, our hypothesis predicts an initial increase in returns following a stock split as investor demand for low-priced stocks leads to overvaluation. This will be followed by low returns for these stocks in the long-run as the mispricing is slowly corrected. Table 13 shows short-run (1-12 month) and long-run (13-36 month) returns in the period after the stock split date. Following Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009), we define stock splits as events with CRSP distribution code of 5523 and split ratio of at least 1.25 to 1. We employ a calendar-time portfolio methodology. Namely, all stocks are aligned based on calendar time and equal and value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated. For value-weighted returns, the weight is the market capitalization of the splitting stocks at the end of the last month. We show both adjusted and unadjusted returns. Unadjusted returns are the excess returns over the risk-free rate, and adjusted returns are the returns to splitting stocks minus the returns to matched stocks. Matched stocks are stocks with similar characteristics that have not recently split. We match stocks on the dimensions of size, book-to-market, momentum, and past skewness.
Specifically, we require matched stocks to be in the same quintile of size, book-to-market, momentum, and skewness. If more than one stock satisfies these criteria, we choose the one with the smallest difference in pre-split Price*. To make sure that the split stock and the matched stock are comparable, we also require that the matched stock's Price* value is between 80% and 125% of the pre-split value of Price* for the split stock. 12 Relative to raw returns, adjusted returns can better control for the effects of other factors on returns. Table 13 shows that split stocks exhibit exactly the predicted pattern. The adjusted returns (also its Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha) in Panel A show that splitting stocks earn higher returns than matched stocks in the 12 months after splitting. This is consistent with increased demand from investors in the period after the split pushing up the prices of these stocks.
However, in the 24 month period following the first 12 months, adjusted returns are significantly negative, indicating that splitting stocks substantially underperform the matched sample, consistent with the recently split stocks becoming overvalued, and this overvaluation slowly correcting over the future.
Along with the adjusted returns, Table 13 also reports the analysis based on unadjusted returns and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alphas. Four-factor alphas of split stocks continue to be significantly positive in the five years after the split date. This is consistent with Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) . The comparison between the adjusted returns and unadjusted returns reveals an important observation. The average "abnormally" high returns of stocks in the 5 years post-split period are shared by other stocks with similar characteristics that did not split. Even for the first year post-split, the four-factor alphas of unadjusted returns are 0.757% and 0.718% per month for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively, but the four-factor alphas of adjusted returns are only 0.190% and 0.011% for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively. This suggests that even for the first year post-split, most of the previously documented abnormal returns are not caused by stock splitting.
Expectational Errors
The results thus far are consistent with overly optimistic expectations for low-priced stocks leading to overpricing of low-priced stocks. In this section, we formally test the hypothesis that market participants are overly optimistic about low-priced stocks. We show that nominal price levels induce expectational errors, causing market participants to be overly optimistic regarding low-priced stocks.
We test for biases in beliefs in two ways. First, we examine earnings surprises and find that investors have overly optimistic expectations of earnings for stocks with low values of Price*, and overly pessimistic expectations of earnings for stocks with high values of Price*.
Second, we directly examine expectations of price appreciation by examining analyst target price forecasts. We find that forecasts of price appreciation are substantially higher for stocks with low values of Price* relative to stocks with high values of Price*. period where dates are found to be most accurate. We also require that the stock price is between $1 and $1,000 at the beginning of the quarter, and that the market capitalization is at least $10 million.
The results in Table 14 Table 4 are 0.988% (0.966%) and 0.871%
(1.158%), respectively. On average, earnings announcements occur four times a year. This means that, on average, roughly 30-60% of the abnormal returns of the long-short trading strategy are realized around earnings announcement. The results lend strong support to the hypothesis that investors are overly optimistic regarding low-priced stocks and overly pessimistic regarding high-priced stocks.
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Next, we examine whether analyst price target forecasts reflect similar overoptimism for low-priced stocks. Price target data is from the IBES unadjusted detail history dataset. We focus on 12-month analyst price target forecasts, as these are by far the most common. We define expected price appreciation as
Expected Price Appreciation t = (Forecast t /Price t-1 ) -1,
where Forecast t is the 12-month price target forecast and Price t-1 is the stock price on the day prior to the price target forecast. In the case that there are multiple forecasts in the same month, we take the average of the expected price appreciation variable. 14 We use the ex-dividend return rather than the cumdividend return because analysts forecast target prices rather than the total expected return (Dechow and You (2013)). The sorts display extremely large differences in analysts' forecasts of price appreciation for stocks of different nominal price levels. The average analyst price appreciation forecast for a stock in the bottom decile of Price* is nearly 96%, compared to an expected 12-month price appreciation of only 3% for stocks in the top decile of Price*. The second column displaying Forecast Error shows that analyst forecasts are certainly not in line with the observed ex-post price appreciation, as they overestimate price appreciation by 87.6%
for stocks in the bottom decile of Price* and underestimate price appreciation by nearly 8% for stocks in the top decile of Price*. Appreciation, and show that the high expected price appreciation that analysts expect for lowpriced stocks is not consistent with the future realized price appreciation of these stocks.
14 The results are virtually identical if we instead use the slightly different adjustment technique of Dechow and You (2013).
Conclusion
We document a substantial nominal price effect in the cross-section of returns. Stocks with low nominal prices have higher risk-adjusted returns than high-priced stocks. Low-priced stocks also experience systematically negative earnings surprises, while high-priced stocks experience systematically positive earnings surprise. The observed evidence is consistent with overly optimistic investor expectations for low-priced stocks resulting in overpricing. Post-split return dynamics are also consistent with this interpretation as we observe initially high returns in the post-split period, consistent with low nominal prices inducing overvaluation, followed by negative abnormal returns in the long-run, consistent with a correction of the overpricing. In sum, the evidence suggests that expectational errors of investors cause the overpricing of low nominal price stocks relative to stocks with high nominal prices. Table 9 . Robustness This table reports four-factor alphas for five sets of robustness tests. In the first set, we examine the measure of Price* using only BPS (book value of equity per share) as the independent variable to estimate fitted stock price per share (model (1) in Table 2 ). The second set of robustness tests shows the results of subperiods. In the third set of analysis, we exclude stocks with price lower than $5. In the fourth set of robustness tests, we report the four-factor alpha of return-weighted portfolio returns, where the weights are (1+the stock's lagged monthly return). The last set of robustness tests shows alphas when the Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) In Panel B, the dependent variable is expected price appreciation based on analysts' projected future stock price, i.e., price target. It is calculated as the 12-month target price forecast divided by the stock price on the day prior to forecast, minus one. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the expected price appreciation minus the observed expost stock price appreciation measured as the cumulative ex-dividend return from the announcement date through 365 calendar days after the announcement date. In the case that multiple analysts' price target forecasts are announced in a month for a stock, we take the average of the expected price appreciation and forecast error. In order to mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize price target based returns at the 1% level for both tails. In addition to the previously defined variables, we define external finance following Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) , as the sum of net equity financing and net debt financing. Net equity financing is measured as the proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (SSTK) less cash payments for the purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) less cash payments for dividends (DV). Net debt financing is measured as the cash proceeds from the issuance of long term debt (DLTIS) less cash payments for long-term reductions (DLTR) less the net changes in current debt (DLCCH). We use the average daily turnover over the most recent month to measure trading volume. Dividend yield is the dividend divided by beginning of period stock price. We adjust the standard errors by Newey and West (1987) 
